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ABSTRACT 
Compulsory licensing in music has paved the way for a limited 
class of new noninteractive services. However, innovation and 
competition are stifled in the field of interactive or otherwise novel 
services due to high transaction costs inherent in direct licensing. 
While the creation of a new compulsory license available to a 
wider array of services may facilitate growth and diversity in new 
markets, it is unlikely that the legislative process can deliver a new 
compulsory regime in time to serve relevant interests. Furthermore, 
the risk exists that legislation written in response to contemporary 
technology will likely fail to recognize the diversity within the 
music industry, and therefore will underserve both artists and 
potential licensees. As such, this brief argues for the creation and 
adoption of a new standardized protocol for artists and labels to 
announce the availability of new content with attached 
standardized licensing terms for automated integration into the 
catalogs of new or existing digital music services. Such a protocol 
would allow for automated systems of pricing, distribution, and 
tracking to reduce transaction costs, increase market transparency, 
and commodify user participation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The internet has irrevocably changed the face of the music industry. 
It has also provided us with what may well prove to be the greatest tools in 
history, not only for creation, but also massive efficient distribution of 
content. At the same time, the music industry has been widely criticized for 
its failures to embrace and adopt the technologies that could best serve 
artists and consumers, to the point where political parties have formed 
solely as a reaction to the policies of organizations representing copyright 
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holders, such as the RIAA.
1
 The RIAA stopped suing individuals for file-
sharing in 2008, despite the fact that music piracy continues.
2
 Still, despite 
the ongoing piracy problem, a wave of legal music services such as Pandora 
and Spotify has arisen in the last decade, providing music to listeners for 
little or no fee. Furthermore, recent data suggests that the rise of these 
services has taken a significant bite out of music piracy.
3
 
Compulsory licensing for noninteractive music services available 
under Section 114 of the Copyright Act has allowed for the creation of 
innumerous legal music services, most notably Pandora, by eliminating the 
need for lengthy negotiations for content, thereby maximizing the available 
catalog of music that may be provided to consumers. The category of 
services for which compulsory licenses are available is, however, quite 
narrow,
4
 and does not accommodate the potential wave of innovative 
interactive music services, which must negotiate for licenses directly with 
copyright holders, who may ask for unreasonable terms or simply refuse. 
 This issue brief does not argue that the legal music industry is 
broken, but rather that it is a shadow of what it could be.
5
 While music 
                                                     
1
 See Nicholas Kulish, Direct Democracy 2.0, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2012, at SR8 
(discussing the Pirate Party of Germany, which seeks to strengthen online privacy 
and to reform copyright and patent law). 
2
 See Elliot Van Buskirk, RIAA to Stop Suing Music Fans, Cut Them Off Instead, 
WIRED (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.wired.com/business/2008/12/riaa-says-it-pl/. 
3
 In response to a recent survey, “[f]orty percent of respondents . . . who decreased 
their illegal file-sharing said they did so because of access to legal streaming 
services like Pandora and Spotify, which are easier to use and don’t present the 
threat of spyware or viruses.” Victor Luckerson, Revenue Up, Piracy Down: Has 
the Music Industry Finally Turned a Corner?, TIME (Feb. 28, 2013), 
http://business.time.com/2013/02/28/revenue-up-piracy-down-has-the-music-
industry-finally-turned-a-corner/. 
4
 An “eligible nonsubscription transmission” under the Copyright Act is essentially 
a digital transmission that is not delivered by an “interactive service.” See 17 
U.S.C. §§ 114(j)(6)-(7) (2012) (defining these terms). Importantly, a service need 
not be classified as strictly an interactive or noninteractive service as a whole, 
because “[i]f an entity offers both interactive and noninteractive services (either 
concurrently or at different times), the noninteractive component shall not be 
treated as part of an interactive service.” Id. at §114(j)(7). While such hybrid 
services may still avail themselves to compulsory licensing under Section 114, they 
are still subject to the full brunt of direct licensing requirements for their interactive 
components. 
5
 But c.f. Ankur Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive Music Industry and the Case for 
Compulsory Licensing in the Digital Distribution of Music, 22 TOURO L. REV. 375 
(2006) (arguing that while technology has reduced the distribution costs in the 
music industry, the dominance over the industry by a small group of firms 
suppresses competition); W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-Middleman: Reshaping the 
Broken Landscape of Music Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 890 (2007) (arguing 
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industry commentators may complain about the state of copyright law with 
regard to new music services and seek legislative remedies,
6
 this brief 
argues that the solution lies not with the legislature, but in utilizing existing 
technological tools to facilitate a new wave of diverse, vibrant, and 
marketable music services. 
Importantly, this brief argues not for the creation of a new music 
service or application, but a new protocol, a backbone of technical tools and 
standardized transactions which might facilitate the marketing and 
transmission of music online. This proposal, the Content Announcement 
Protocol for Standardized Licenses (CAPSL) protocol, would combine tools 
used across the web, such as RSS, and an expansion on standardized and 
machine-readable licenses, specifically those of the Creative Commons, 
which would allow copyright owners to announce the availability of content 
and attach standardized licensing terms in a format that can be searched, 
indexed, and licensed by automated processes. 
I. CURRENT SYSTEMS OF LICENSING CONTENT INHIBIT INNOVATION 
AND EFFICIENCY 
A. Compulsory Licensing Under Section 114 
1. Interactive vs. noninteractive services 
In the realm of digital music services, whether or not a service can 
utilize compulsory licensing under Section 114 of the Copyright Act turns 
on a single distinction—whether the service is interactive or noninteractive.7 
Given the nearly infinite amount of possible configurations or combinations 
of services, the distinction is subject to a great degree of ambiguity.
8
 
At its most basic, the distinction comes down to whether the user 
can actively and specifically decide which track he or she wants to hear at 
any time; if he or she can, the service is interactive.
9
 For example, the 
                                                                                                                       
the dominance of rights intermediaries in the music industry reduces market 
efficiency, “thwart[s] optimal public access to recorded songs[,]” and prevents the 
creation of new revenue streams for creators). 
6
 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
7
 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i) (“The performance of a sound recording . . . shall 
be subject to statutory licensing . . . if the transmission is not part of an interactive 
service . . . .”). 
8
 “The statute provides little guidance as to the meaning of its operative term 
‘specially created.’” Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 152 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
9
 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7) (defining “interactive service” as “one that enables a 
member of the public to receive[,] . . . on request, a transmission of a particular 
sound recording . . . .”). 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 165  
popular service Spotify, which allows users to search its catalog for specific 
tracks and play the tracks on demand, is classified as an interactive 
service.
10
 If the service is more passive, mimicking terrestrial radio, and 
merely allows the user to specify a “station” based on genre or other 
categories, but does not allow the user to specifically select tracks, the 
service is classified as noninteractive.
11
 Currently the most popular of such 
noninteractive services is Pandora, which allows users to create “stations” 
based on artists or combinations of artists, or genres.
12
 
2. Royalties and accounting in split copyrights 
Every piece of recorded music contains two distinct copyrights; one 
for the composition and lyrics, and another for the particular recording of 
the underlying composition.
13
 For example, the recording of Jimi Hendrix’s 
performance of “All Along the Watchtower” implicates the rights of 
Hendrix with respect to the recording of the performance itself, and the 
rights of Bob Dylan, who wrote the music and lyrics that Hendrix 
performed. 
The Copyright Act requires that any person wishing to publicly 
perform a piece of music receive a license for both the sound recording and 
the underlying composition.
14
 
Performance rights organizations (PROs), such ASCAP, BMI, and 
SESAC offer blanket licenses and collect royalties on behalf of their 
respective members for public performances of underlying compositions.
15
 
As a result of anti-trust consent decrees, these PROs are required by law to 
offer licenses to all comers, and to offer rates that are uniform for all 
similarly situated licensees.
16
 However, membership in the PROs is 
                                                     
10
 See supra note 9. 
11
 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6) (citing “eligible nonsubscription transmission” as an 
example of a “noninteractive . . . digital audio transmission”). 
12
 The stations are curated by Pandora’s sophisticated algorithm, drawing results 
from the Music Genome Project. About the Music Genome Project, PANDORA, 
http://www.pandora.com/about/mgp (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
13
 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3), (6).  
14
 Even where someone has received a license for a sound recording, he must still 
acquire a license for the underlying composition. See 17 U.S.C. 114(d)(3)(C) 
(“[A]n interactive service may not publicly perform a sound recording unless a 
license has been granted for the public performance of any copyrighted musical 
work contained in the sound recording.” (emphasis added)). 
15
 While these entities are commonly referred to in the industry as performance 
rights organizations, the Copyright Act refers to such organizations as 
“performance rights societies.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(3)(E)(ii). 
16
 Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 355, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff'd, 
683 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The Decree requires BMI to make licenses available 
for public performances of its music and to provide applicants with proposed 
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nonexclusive and voluntary, and as such, songwriters and music publishers 
may withdraw from these organizations if they decide that it is in their best 
interest to do so.
17
 
There is currently no performance right for sound recordings on 
terrestrial radio,
18
 but as a result of the Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recording Act of 1995 (DPRA), recording artists are entitled to royalties for 
the use of recordings in digital music transmissions such as streaming 
services or satellite radio.
19
 The rates for noninteractive digital 
transmissions are set by the Copyright Royalties Board (CRB), a division of 
the Library of Congress.
20
 However, copyright owners and licensees may 
independently negotiate for their own rates, which may be paid in lieu of the 
CRB rates.
21
 
                                                                                                                       
license fees upon request, and prohibits BMI from ‘discriminating in rates or terms 
between licensees similarly situated’”). 
17
 However, copyright owners cannot withdraw individual rights, such as “new 
media rights” from the ASCAP catalog. After major labels began withdrawing such 
rights in an attempt to gain leverage in negotiations with Pandora, and Pandora filed 
suit in the Southern District of New York, the court ruled that while parties could 
withdraw all rights from ASCAP, such piecemeal withdrawals of individual rights 
were impermissible. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and 
Publrs., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133133, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013) (“To 
adopt ASCAP's position would be to endorse the untenable proposition that [the 
consent decree] was intended to allow publishers to deprive certain existing 
licensees of individually chosen works while keeping those works in the ASCAP 
repertory . . . .”). 
18
 Efforts have been made to create a performance right for sound recordings in 
terrestrial radio play. See, e.g., Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Free Market Royalty Act, H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (2013). These efforts 
have largely been criticized based on a notion that terrestrial radio play serves as 
free publicity for recording artists, which compels listeners to go out and purchase 
the music they hear on the radio. See Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 848 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 27-28 (2009) (statement of 
Rep. Daniel E. Lungren) (“I’m attracted to buying . . . what I hear on the radio. 
That’s where I am introduced to it and that’s what attracts me to buy something . . . 
. And so I can see that argument very, very strongly, the promotional feature.”). 
However, given the recent decline in music sales, it is worth asking whether this 
historical justification remains reliable. 
19
 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) 
(codified at 17 U.S.C §§ 106(6), 114–15 (2012)). 
20
 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(a), (b)(1) (defining the function of the Copyright Royalty 
Judges, which are appointed by the Librarian of Congress, as “mak[ing] 
determinations and adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of royalty payments 
as provided in section[] . . . 114 . . . .”). 
21
 Id. at § 114(f)(3). 
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Digital performance royalties for sound recordings are collected and 
distributed by SoundExchange, a non-profit PRO.
22
 Royalties collected by 
SoundExchange are split between the owner of the copyright (typically the 
record label), the featured recording artist, and the session musicians.
23
 This 
split, when compared to many recording contracts, is more agreeable to 
recording artists,
24
 as they are guaranteed forty-five percent of the royalties 
derived from the performance of the recording,
25
 with the remaining five 
percent split between the session musicians,
26
 and fifty percent going to the 
owner of the recording.
27
 
B. Acquiring Content and Licenses for New Services 
Imagine the stereotypical high-tech startup-to-be. There are two 
students drinking Mountain Dew at their desks in a dorm room, hacking 
away at their keyboards, eyes on their respective screens while ranting over 
their shoulders about the next big breakthrough in music distribution. Theirs 
will not be a conversation about old business models, except in passing, to 
compare established industry players to dinosaurs. 
The idea that will push these innovators to spend six weeks staying 
up all night coding before drawing enough attention and venture capital to 
drop out of school and pursue their work of genius is not, “let’s do the same 
thing as one hundred other businesses.” Unfortunately for consumers and 
creators, history has shown that when it comes to innovative channels of 
distribution or patterns of consumption, when copyright owners meet new 
technology, whatever the idea is, one side will presume it is illegal, and the 
other side will not care.
28
 
In an arena where speed matters, the dominant players code first 
and ask questions later. For some, that kind of attitude represents a rational 
                                                     
22
 SOUND EXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 18, 
2013). 
23
 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2). 
24
 Recording artists have, historically, often received little in the way of royalties 
from sound recordings, as recording contracts typically contain clauses wherein 
royalties are withheld until the label has recouped its losses incurred in the 
production and marketing of a sound recording. 
25
 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)(d). 
26
 Id. at § 114(g)(2)(b)-(c). 
27
 Id. at § 114(g)(2)(a). 
28
 The most historically important instance of this dynamic in the realm of 
copyright law was illustrated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), in which major film studios sued Sony after it introduced 
the Betamax video tape recorder. History, obviously, came down on the side of 
Sony, ironically proving that the technology the film industry fought eventually 
became a major source of revenue. 
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risk. Developers may operate in a legal gray area for a prolonged period 
before growing large enough to draw the attention of the Recording 
Industry Association of America, or its constituent members.
29
 They may, in 
some cases, count on the fact that the court systems are slow enough that if 
a startup grows fast enough, it may be able to raise enough money to pay for 
decent lawyers or create enough potential for revenue that it may gain 
leverage when entering into direct licensing deals with copyright holders or 
out of court settlements.
30
 
For many, however, the risk is more akin to a lottery than an 
investment strategy, and most players lose, often before the game begins.
31
 
At times a site that adopts this attitude can succeed, as with YouTube,
32
 but 
other times the project collapses, and we are left with a mere tombstone of a 
website informing us of the results of an adverse court decision.
33
 
Start-ups require capital, and some venture capitalists are hesitant to 
engage in the online music market because the process of licensing is so 
complicated and costly.
34
 Thus, to promote the legal music industry, one is 
                                                     
29
 For an example of this interplay, look to the online streaming service 
Grooveshark, which relied on a hybrid system of direct licenses, and reliance on a 
DMCA safe-harbor provision, while facing numerous lawsuits by copyright 
holders. Ben Sisario, Digital Notes: Grooveshark Wins a Battle, But Can It Win the 
War?, NYTIMES.COM (Jul. 11, 2012, 5:56 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2012/07/11/digital-notes-grooveshark-wins-a-battle-but-can-it-win-the-war/. 
30
 For example, YouTube was once rife with unauthorized content. Now, due to the 
perceived futility and perhaps foolishness associated with trying to keep 
unauthorized content off of YouTube, services have arisen which allow musicians 
to monetize the demand for infringement by placing ads on infringing videos, and 
collecting revenue from those ads. See, e.g., RUMBLEFISH, http://rumblefish.com/ 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (touting “YouTube Monetization” on its website). 
31
 For an expansive study of failures in innovative strategies in the music industry, 
see Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L. 
REV. 891 (2012). 
32
 In response to an email between YouTube founders in 2005, regarding a 
copyright clip from CNN which had been uploaded to their site, Steve Chen 
encouraged Chad Hurley to take a lax attitude with regard to copyright 
enforcement, and founder Jawed Karim “agreed, indicating that ‘the CNN space 
shuttle clip, I like. we can remove it once we're bigger and better known, but for 
now that clip is fine.’” Viacom Int’l, Inc., v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 34 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
33
 See, e.g., GROKSTER, http://www.grokster.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) 
(showing a message stating that the website is no longer available due to an adverse 
Supreme Court decision).  
34
 See Randy Lewis, Internet Radio Fairness Act Debate Opens in Washington, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/30/ 
entertainment/la-et-ms-internet-radio-fairness-act-pandora-congress-hearings-
20121129 (“[David] Pakman said his venture firm is staying out of the field 
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left with a choice: either change the laws regarding how music is licensed or 
create tools to simplify and expedite the process without the need for 
copyright reform. 
II. THE LICENSING PROBLEM IS BETTER SERVED WITH CODE 
A. Legislative Inertia and Established Interests 
Often, in response to a perceived market failure or limit on 
technology or expression, scholars and industry commentators call for the 
creation of a new compulsory license.
35
 Powerful parties in the music 
industry, however, are reluctant to create new compulsory licenses, despite 
the apparent increases in market efficiencies they may offer.
36
 As related to 
the possibility of a compulsory license for music sampling, entertainment 
lawyer Andrew Bart, explained in an interview: 
[T]he policy behind a compulsory license leads to more efficiency 
because the use cannot be vetoed and a price cap has been set. 
“Sample licensing doesn’t have that right now, and so there’s 
inefficiency,” he says. But he also notes that “efficiency, to a certain 
degree, reduces discretion.” Copyright holders lose discretion–the 
right to deny permission–under a compulsory license. Permission has 
an economic dimension; it facilitates a higher price for licensors.”
37
 
Numerous attempts have been made to reform music licensing in 
relation to digital technology through legislation. The Music Online 
Competition Act of 2001 (MOCA),
38
 sought to increase competition in the 
interactive streaming market by limiting copyright owners’ ability to license 
                                                                                                                       
‘because of the current licensing regime – it virtually prevents success. The failure 
rate of digital music companies is among the highest of all fields Venrock looks at, 
making them non-investable businesses.’”). 
35
 See, e.g., Robert M. Vrana, Note, The Remix Artist’s Catch-22: A Proposal for 
Compulsory Licensing for Transformative, Sampling-Based Music, 68 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 811, 847 (2011) (calling for licensing compelled by statute). 
36
 National Music Publishers Association President David Israelite recently 
complained about compulsory licensing for mechanical licenses, stating, “We are 
laboring under a 100-plus-year-old law that says we have a compulsory license with 
regard to our mechanical rights. We have no negotiating power. We must license it. 
And we've seen what that's done in the marketplace.” David Israelite, David 
Israelite, NMPA President’s Guest Post: Why Music Publishers Must Adopt 
Blanket Licensing, BILLBOARD (Jun. 24, 2011 1:19 PM), http://www.billboard.com/ 
biz/articles/news/publishing/1177339/david-israelite-nmpa-presidents-guest-post-
why-music-publishers. 
37
 KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND 
CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 228 (2011). 
38
 H.R. 2724, 107th Cong. (2001). 
170 THE CASE FOR CAPSL [Vol. 13 
 
with affiliated services on discriminatory terms.
39
 The Section 115 Reform 
Act of 2006 (SIRA) sought to streamline the process of licensing music for 
digital services by creating Music Rights Organizations (MROs) to replace 
the fragmented system of licensing through Performance Rights 
Organizations (PROs).
40
 The Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012 (IRFA) 
was designed to “adopt fair standards and procedures” for setting licensing 
rates for webcasters.
41
 Congressman Jerrold Nadler, responding to IRFA, 
announced another bill, The Interim Fairness in Radio Starts Today Act of 
2012 (Interim FIRST), seeking to address many of the same concerns with 
regard to a disparity in how license rates are set for simultaneous streams of 
terrestrial broadcasts.
42
 MOCA and IRFA died in committee,
43
 and Interim 
FIRST never developed past the commentary drafting stage. 
These attempts to change the processes and terms by which digital 
music services acquire and pay for music have been met with uncertainty 
and hostility, from both copyright holders and licensees.
44
 While their 
approach, ideologies, visions of the music industry, and constituent backing 
vary greatly, these recent attempts to change the way music is licensed in 
online services have one thing in common: they did not pass.
45
 
                                                     
39
 Alexander Davie & Christine Soares, Note, The Music Online Competition Act of 
2001: Moderate Change or Radical Reform?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0031, ¶ 
7 (2001). 
40
 Section 115 Reform Act of 2006, H.R. 5553, 109th Cong. (2006). 
41
 Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 6480, 112th Cong. (2012). 
42
 See Interim Fairness in Radio Starting Today Act of 2012, 112th Cong. § 2(11),) 
(Discussion Draft Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://nadler.house.gov/sites/ 
nadler.house.gov/files/documents/NADLER_153_xml.pdf (“All other radio 
formats, such as satellite, cable and Internet radio, compensate recording artists and 
copyright owners for their music.”). 
43
 See H.R. 6480 - Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/6480/all-actions (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2015) (showing no action after committee referrals). 
44
 See Behind the Deal: Music Licensing Reform & Proposed Bills, BILLBOARD 
(Jul. 19, 2005 12:00 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1409203/ 
behind-the-deal-music-licensing-reform-proposed-bills (“Nine music and digital-
media trade groups with a wide range of ideas about music licensing voiced a single 
opinion . . . to a House subcommittee. . . . [T]hey trashed the U.S. Copyright 
Office's proposed bill that would abolish the compulsory mechanical license and 
form music rights organizations, or MROs.”). 
45
 The list of bills modifying music licensing is, of course, far from exhaustive. 
While not implementing sweeping reforms to music licensing, smaller measures 
adjusting royalty rates for specific classes of services have consistently passed both 
houses of Congress. See, e.g., Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, H.R. 2344, 111th 
Cong. (2009); Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, H.R. 7084, 110th Cong. (2008); 
Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, H.R. 5469, 107th Cong. (2002).  
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The problem of legislative inertia becomes all the more hazardous 
when new industries or new business models stand to replace old and 
powerful institutions.
46
 This is especially true of media institutions with 
very vocal and well-funded lobbies like the RIAA or the National 
Association of Broadcasters.
47
 When compared to the lobbies associated 
with music and broadcasting, the lobby for nineteen-year-olds in hoodies 
and flip-flop sandals is considerably smaller. Thus, we should not be 
surprised that when someone proposes the creation of a new compulsory 
license which may threaten the role of intermediaries like the RIAA, 
ASCAP, BMI, or the National Music Publishers Association, if only in a 
small corner of the market, the proposed legislation will be met with 
considerable opposition.
48
 
The DPRA was passed in 1995, and nearly twenty years later both 
sides of the debate surrounding licensing of content believe the current 
system leaves much to be desired.
49
 For example, in the debates surrounding 
the IRFA, webcasting giant Pandora complained that it pays too much in 
royalties (when compared to satellite radio), the PROs disagreed, and 
musicians and Representative John Conyers opined that recording artists are 
receiving unfair treatment across the board.
50
 
There is something to be taken away from the debates, however. 
Nearly twenty years after the DPRA, only the scofflaws are happy. There is 
no shortage of music, there is no shortage of technical expertise, and no 
shortage of demand. Consumers, musicians, and engineers cannot wait 
another twenty years for a statutory overhaul. 
                                                     
46
 See W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of 
Music Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 890 (2007) (“Congress perhaps should take 
seriously the Register of Copyrights’ rather diplomatic counsel that ‘in order for 
such a solution [to the crisis in music licensing] to be accomplished, it may be 
necessary for Congress to make some important decisions notwithstanding the lack 
of consensus among all affected parties.’”) (quoting Music Licensing Reform: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of 
Copyrights)). 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. 
49
 See supra note 36. 
50
 See Lewis, supra note 34 (“‘A more appropriate [bill] title might be the paycheck 
reduction act, because what it would do is lower the royalties that Internet radio 
pays by more than 85%. I want to make a prediction: This bill may well be the 
catalyst to advancing an AM/FM music performance royalty.’” (quoting Rep. 
Conyers)). 
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B. Code is Faster Than Legislation 
There are obvious benefits to changing laws. Most notably, of 
course, when the process is successful, the new rules will have the force of 
the government behind them. Furthermore, the stability of the law may 
foster investment by making engagement with the system more predictable. 
However, like drafting a bill, writing an app also takes time—sometimes 
lots of time, depending on the complexity of the job that each seeks to 
accomplish. The key difference between the two is what governs the 
success of a program or a law. If a substantial group of people, or a small 
group with deep pockets, disagrees with a bill, it will not work, because it 
will not pass.
51
 
The problems of code are different. Success or failure in developing 
an app often has more to do with the availability of caffeine than strict 
social consensus. A measure of consensus is, however, vital to the success 
of a large service that must capture the necessary network effects for the 
service to be successful. If code has problems, fewer people will want to use 
it, and the service will suffer due to their absence, either through a lack of 
nodes in a network, a lack of user generated content, or a lack of a user base 
to attract advertisers. However, code can often be patched after launch, and 
customer demands can be met relatively quickly. This is typically untrue in 
the case of amending laws. 
Even assuming, however, that the problems of licensing gaps, 
disparities in rates for similar services, and the problems of inaccessible 
content in large services can be solved with code rather than law, it is 
unlikely that such a problem can be solved with the introduction of some 
new lone service. This is, quite simply, because the next Spotify will not 
and should not be the last Spotify. Evolution in an industry requires diverse 
business approaches, and experimentation, but behemoths have little 
incentive to experiment once their revenue streams are established. Barring 
the introduction of some benevolent monopoly force into the music 
industry, looking out for the interests of songwriters, record labels, 
recording artists, retailers, and customers alike, these problems are unlikely 
to be addressed by any specific product. 
Instead, for a deeply rooted digital problem, the remedy must be a 
deeply rooted digital solution. Such a solution needs to address not just a 
particular program, but must provide a backbone for a class of programs, 
and leave open the opportunity for new classes to arise. It must create a way 
for multiple services and players throughout the music market to 
communicate, negotiate, exchange products, and utilize diverse strategies to 
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capitalize on talent and consumer base. We need not just a program, but a 
protocol. 
C. Standardized Protocols Promote Positive Externalities 
The development of open underlying protocols such as TCP/IP, 
HTTP, or on the more radical edge, the BitTorrent protocol, has allowed 
multiple developers at higher layers to create and profit from diverse 
services.
52
 Similarly, the development of an underlying protocol for 
licensing and distributing content would facilitate the creation of a diverse 
class of music services.
53
 
There are instances where the adoption of an open protocol would 
hurt a business, particularly when a business has invested a significant 
amount of money into establishing itself as a dominant player. The Internet 
telephone brand Skype is a prime example of this. It is in Skype’s interest to 
use a proprietary protocol, thus channeling huge numbers of users to use its 
service exclusively. Any work developing an open protocol would only 
harm its business, as free-riders could capitalize on Skype’s labor to 
develop a competing interoperable service. 
By comparison, the BitTorrent protocol functions as a single open-
source protocol and has allowed for the creation of innumerous BitTorrent 
‘clients,’ which offer diverse features, but are all nonetheless interoperable. 
In this way, the users of one client are able to benefit from the work of the 
developers of that particular client, as well as the other BitTorrent clients, 
and the developers and distributors of each client benefit from the user base 
of every other client. 
The adoption of a standardized protocol in music licensing and 
delivery stands to benefit users, developers, and copyright owners alike, 
precisely because there are so many interdependent players within the 
industry. By and large, record labels are not in the business of streaming 
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music, and thus have no reason to adopt their own proprietary protocol for 
transmission. 
Streaming services may simply send out their own one-size-fits all 
licensing contracts to record labels, but unless the service can promise 
copyright owners significant volume, the service has no guarantee that it 
will reach an agreement with labels, particularly as such agreements often 
contain non-disclosure agreements preventing other parties from knowing 
where to start negotiating.
54
 
Transparency in the terms of the agreement would benefit copyright 
owners and streaming services alike, which may base their decision on 
whether or not to develop or pursue a particular venture on the availability 
of standard favorable terms. Furthermore, services, particularly new 
services, could benefit from a standard protocol for content delivery from 
copyright holders to transmission services, as it would allow them to draw 
from a larger pool of content, and standardized licensing terms would cut 
down on their startup expenses by reducing transaction costs. 
Musicians stand to benefit from both content delivery and licensing 
standardization for one simple reason: in order to tap into the mainstream, 
there must be a mainstream, and the current fragmentation of the market, 
particularly among independent artists, makes reaching all but the most 
engaged consumers difficult.
55
 
III. HOW CAPSL MIGHT WORK 
First, it must be said that protocols for standardized licensing and 
content distribution are nothing new. Much of what will be described in 
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terms of standardized licensing here is based upon methods adopted by the 
Creative Commons.
56
 
 The key difference between Creative Commons licenses and 
CAPSL is in its focus. Creative Commons licenses are intended to facilitate 
the promotion of a common pool of content for creators of all types of 
media to contribute to and pull from in the creation of their respective 
content by relaxing certain reserved rights.
57
 By comparison, CAPSL 
licenses will permit copyright owners to retain all of their rights under 
copyright except, in a functional sense, the ability to scrutinize a firm before 
choosing to enter into licensing negotiations. Most simply, Creative 
Commons licenses are intended to promote the creation of content, while 
CAPSL is aimed at distributing content. 
A. Announcing New Content 
In order for a service to distribute content, it must know about the 
content. As such, a copyright owner who seeks to distribute her music must 
have some way of announcing to potential customers, whether they are 
music services or individual listeners, that some music is available. A 
system of content announcement must accomplish at least two tasks. First, it 
must clearly define a list of content to be distributed in a standardized and 
machine-readable way. Second, it must allow for new content to be 
categorically linked with other content for purposes of subscriptions, 
attribution, and payment. 
Creative Commons licenses have made use of a machine readable 
“layer,” which allows search services to locate websites that have Creative 
Commons licenses embedded into their code, so as to index such content 
and allow creators to quickly find material to build upon.
58
 A similar 
method may be adopted to allow music services to find content to distribute. 
The key difference is that Creative Commons licenses are used by 
individual artists aimed at other individual artists. In order to be 
successfully deployed in a music service market, the machine readable layer 
must facilitate massive “scraping,” automated indexing and data extraction. 
This has been accomplished by limited non-commercial web radio projects 
using music marked with Creative Commons licenses.
59
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A key aspect of content announcement is the ability of a protocol to 
facilitate easy subscription to and aggregation of content from a wide array 
of sources automatically. Currently, websites have accomplished this 
through the use of RSS, even in the case of rich content like music.
60
 RSS, 
which stands for “Really Simple Syndication” is a light-weight system 
which allows content creators to define content into “feeds” for syndication. 
These are tucked into the metadata of a website so that aggregators of 
content can check the site automatically and notify users when something 
new appears.
61
 RSS is widely used by BitTorrent clients to allow users to 
automatically download files matching certain search criteria on a 
scheduled basis.
62
 
Where RSS, on its own, falls short of serving the commercial 
market is in attaching license terms specifically aimed at categories of 
licensees to the same tools that allow the content to be searched, aggregated, 
and syndicated. A music service cannot rely on searchable RSS feeds or 
rich metadata describing the content of a site if there is no implication that it 
is permitted to use that content, or that the terms match the intended use.
63
 
B. Creating Standard Licenses 
The many uses of music require different types of licenses, so in 
order to facilitate an efficient licensing scheme, a system of standardized 
licenses must account for these different types of uses with terms that are 
appropriate for each. It is vital that the terms are standardized to allow 
automated services to search for the licenses, and to utilize that content 
where they find recognized licensing terms. 
The Creative Commons uses six pre-defined licenses that licensors 
may choose from in defining the scope of uses he or she wishes to permit.
64
 
The fact that the licenses are predefined is vital, as it allows for the use of 
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their “machine readable layer” of the license, which allows search engines 
and other services to index available content.
65
 This layer uses the Creative 
Commons Rights Expression Language, a standard developed by the 
Creative Commons,
66
 with a recommendation that publishers utilize 
“‘default’ syntaxes and embedding schemes for content creators and 
publishers who want to use Creative Commons licenses without needing to 
be concerned about extraction mechanisms.”67 
Machines cannot understand subtle differences in contracts in a 
meaningful way so as to serve as an effective agent of a music service. 
More importantly, developers are simply not talented enough to anticipate 
the infinite possible variations in language or descriptions of possible uses. 
As such, the language must be consistent, based in a categorical list of pre-
approved uses. However, while the language defining the uses must be 
standardized, the same is not true for prices. 
C. Tracking the Market 
While in many ways CAPSL is a market solution to a licensing 
problem, it may be difficult to see why it may not fall prey to the same 
problems of traditional direct licensing practices. The answer is rather 
simple: efficient markets require good information, and CAPSL provides 
plenty of that, while current practices provide very little.
68
 
Where terms of use, specific transactions, prices, and volume of 
content available are all open and available to index, search, and process, 
the market dynamics of music licensing may change dramatically. The 
implications of such open pricing systems, coupled with the possibility of 
automated pricing and negotiation are discussed in the next section. 
IV. NEW POSSIBILITIES IN MUSIC MARKET 
A. Market Transparency and Dynamic Pricing 
Automation in the digital era is fast, and when applied to principles 
of economics the results can be staggering. Where prices are available, and 
importantly, organized in such a fashion so as to be readily indexed, market 
data becomes simpler to generate. This allows for the appearance of 
information services catering to music services, providing independent 
market data that is accurate up to the minute. With this market-wide data, 
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copyright owners will themselves be able to price their content based on 
current data, to remain competitive, and importantly, dynamic. 
By making reference to independent sources of pricing data, 
licensors may define their prices not just in blunt numbers, but as 
algorithmic expressions referring to external variables. For example, a 
single play may cost, as a fixed price, $0.0019 per play. Or in a dynamic 
system where x is the reported average price of a play for a track in a 
particular genre, a CAPSL license may offer the use of the track for x, or if 
the owner should feel his track is worth more than the average, 1.2x, or if he 
wants to consistently undercut the market 0.8x. These are simple examples, 
but there is no limit to the sophistication of such schemes. Similarly, 
licensees may design algorithms that will only accept licensing terms within 
a set range of prices, and may prioritize licenses with better prices for 
particular genres.
69
 
Consider a hypothetical musician, Lady Googoo, who is about to 
release a new dance track. She may consider, as a pricing strategy, offering 
her track for a slightly reduced price, just below the market average, upon 
its release to incentivize music services to play it more in the first days of its 
release. Then, once it is established as a genuine ear-worm, to the point that 
listeners are demanding the track and failure to provide the hit could 
threaten the licensee’s user base, she may leverage her current value by 
pricing the track just above the market average for similar tracks. 
Such changes in the ability to automate buying and selling have not 
arisen without controversy. Recently high-frequency trading has shaken the 
stock market, at one point accounting for sixty percent of U.S. stock trades 
in 2009.
70
 The speed at which stocks could be traded placed traditional 
traders at a disadvantage when an algorithm could detect and leverage a 
desire to buy: “[i]ndeed, certain high-frequency traders were forcing long-
term investors, including those who managed funds that held ordinary 
people’s retirement accounts, to constantly buy higher and sell lower. The 
game seemed rigged.”71 Similarly, absurdities arising in the independent 
seller market on Amazon.com showed that algorithmic pricing could, at 
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times, deliver absurd results.
72
 However, a notable difference between 
stocks and music licenses is that music licenses are typically non-
transferrable, and thus not subject to greedy algorithms looking to step 
ahead in line and resell to willing buyers at a higher price. 
B. Incentivizing Promotion and Curation 
The online music industry has lost an important class of players 
who were, while perhaps not vital, still quite important to music sales and 
the listener experience. Record shop owners, at least the romanticized 
version, once provided a significant service to both record companies and 
customers. Good salesmanship required a shopkeeper to be a skilled curator, 
able to identify the underlying desires of the customer, to give the customer 
what he wanted, and what he did not know he wanted when he walked in. 
This is what the industry today calls, in simple terms, “discovery,” that is, 
helping users find new artists. In the days of shops, it resulted in the sales of 
more records and customers with expanding taste. Today, it results in more 
playlists on Spotify, more blog posts, and with its semi-algorithmic 
curation, more channels on Pandora. 
Unfortunately, much of that curatorial skill is being wasted and is 
resulting, quite simply, in large archives of unauthorized content. Operators 
of music blogs can garner large followings, but because of the difficulty in 
licensing content, they often cannot sell downloads directly or effectively 
capture advertising revenue. Existing music services offer affiliate programs 
by which a blogger could refer a user to buy a track through iTunes,
73
 but 
that simply introduces another intermediary. Additionally, without a 
standard protocol for buying content, the affiliates must post multiple links 
to various music vendors and maintain separate affiliate accounts for each, 
in hopes of catching, not just a user’s taste in music, but in vendors. Most 
importantly, the practice forces users to leave their site. This is the 
equivalent of a shop owner saying, “You will love this record! Now go buy 
it at the shop down the street.” 
Record store owners could rely on the right of resale to distribute 
music.
74
 Online, however, it is not so simple. A standardized protocol 
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lowers the barriers of entry into the market so that even the smallest 
operator can sell or stream any music (which adopts the protocol) in his 
own “shop” at any price he wants (as long as he pays the copyright owner 
what she asks). This allows the curator to capitalize on his own added value 
and incentivizes him to promote music, which benefits everyone. 
C. Transcending One-Size-Fits-All Solutions 
¶1 As a final matter, dramatically reducing transaction costs, across the 
board, in music licensing overcomes problems arising from the fact that 
copyright law, and compulsory licenses in particular, treat all music alike.
75
 
Debates surrounding copyright law in music today suffer from implicit (and 
often dated) assumptions about how music is created, what musicians are 
like, and how music is sold.
76
 Regardless of whether a person is a composer 
for film scores, a retired blues singer, or a seasoned touring drummer in his 
fifth band, copyright law as it relates to performance royalties treats all 
musicians like they are nineteen-year-old singer-songwriters who are just 
about to make it. 
The current inability of copyright owners to account for their own 
specific investments, in that they are subjected to compulsory licensing 
rates or blanket licensing rates through membership in ASCAP, does little 
to promote a diverse music industry. It is as if we are pricing Coca-Cola, 
coffee, and Dom Perignon as though the differences between them are 
simply in the volume of the containers, and scratching our heads as to why 
the market seems distorted. Creating underlying protocols and leaving the 
decisions about how to market and distribute content to users at a higher 
level may help alleviate some of this tension 
CONCLUSION 
The problems of the music industry, and copyright law, are many. 
However, gains have been made in utilizing technology to better serve both 
customers and copyright holders. The development and adoption of CAPSL 
would go further, using technology to provide the backbone upon which 
creators and innovators can efficiently trade, and help each other grow. 
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